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Corruption and International Valuation: 
Does Virtue Pay? 
 
Abstract 
 
Using firm-level data from 46 countries, we investigate the relation between 
corruption – the misuse of public office for private gains – and international 
corporate values.  Our analysis shows that firms from more (less) corrupt 
countries trade at significantly lower (higher) market multiples.  This result is 
robust to the inclusion of many control variables suggested by valuation theory.  
On average, an increase in the corruption level from that of Singapore to that of 
Mexico corresponds to a decrease of 18.1 in the PE ratio, and a decrease of 1.17 
in the PB ratio. We conclude that corruption has significant economic 
consequences for shareholder value. 
 
 
 3
1. Introduction 
 
The laws within a country, and the quality of their enforcement, are potentially important 
determinants of shareholder value.  Investors rely on a country’s judicial/legislative system to 
ensure their claims to an enterprise’s future cash flows are honored.  A country’s legal and 
regulatory system also affects the ability of its firms’ to raise capital, hire employees, and 
explore new investment opportunities.  In all these endeavors, a corporate manager must rely on 
the stability of the judicial/legislative system, and the efficacy with which its laws are enforced.1   
 
In this study, we investigate the relation between shareholder value and corruption – defined as 
the misuse of public office for private gain.  Corruption has emerged as a major issue in the 
global economy.  Recent academic studies have examined the effect of corruption on a wide 
range of social and economic phenomena, including economic growth, direct foreign investment, 
and the quality of health care and educational services.2  A number of international organizations 
also have an on-going mandate to combat corruption.3  However, little is known about how the 
level of corruption in a country might affect the valuation of its corporations to shareholders.   
 
Using firm-level data from 46 countries, we examine the empirical relation between corruption, 
as measured by Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), and 
international corporate values.4  Our analysis takes advantage of recent advances in valuation 
theory and estimation techniques to control for country-, industry-, and firm-level characteristics 
that affect cross-border valuation.  We show that these factors explain a substantial portion of the 
variations in firm values internationally.  Moreover, we document a significant empirical relation 
between the level of corruption within a country and corporate values. 
 
                                                 
1 For a comprehensive discussion of the relation between law and finance, see La Porta et al. (1998). 
2 For example, Mauro (1995) investigates the effect of corruption on economic growth, Wei (1997) examines the 
effect of corruption on direct foreign investments, and Gupta et al. (2001) evaluates the association between 
corruption and the quality of healthcare and educational services.   
3 For example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF; www.imf.org), the World Bank (www.worldbank.org), the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD; www.oecdwash.org), Transparency 
International (www.transparency.org) and Community Information, Empowerment and Transparency (CIET; 
www.ciet.org). 
4 We discuss the composition of the CPI and the robustness of the results in detail later in the paper. 
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Specifically, our analysis shows that firms from more (less) corrupt countries trade at 
significantly lower (higher) market multiples.  This result is robust to the inclusion of many 
control variables suggested by valuation theory – i.e., cross-sectional variations associated with 
profitability, expected growth, risk, and R&D expenditures.  In addition, we control for country-
level variations in inflation, real GDP growth, GDP per capita, as well as proxies for shareholder 
rights and corporate governance.  Even after controlling for these variables, we find that an 
increase in the corruption level from that of Singapore to that of Mexico results in a decrease of 
18.1 in the price-to-earnings ratio (PE), and a decrease of 1.17 in the price-to-book ratio (PB).   
 
Our study builds on, and extends, two main streams of research.  First, we extend the valuation 
research on the relative pricing of firms using market multiples to an international arena.  
Specifically, our results show that a set of economic drivers of firm value that was successful in 
explaining market multiples in the United States (e.g., Bhojraj and Lee (2001)) can be adapted to 
explain global valuations with the addition of certain country-level factors.  In fact, our results 
demonstrate the relative importance of country-, industry-, and firm-level variables in explaining 
variations in P/E and P/B multiples across countries. 
 
Second, we extend the evidence on the economic consequences of corruption.  In an increasingly 
integrated global economy, interest in (and awareness of) the effects of corruption is on the rise.5  
While presumption of the damaging effects of corruption is widespread, direct evidence on its 
economic consequences has been scarce.  Contributing to the problem is the pervasive nature of 
corruption.  Because corruption is associated with a variety of other social and economic ills – 
including anemic economic growth, reduced foreign investment, reduced shareholder protection, 
lower healthcare and education spending – its direct impact on corporate values can be difficult 
to isolate. 
 
Our study tackles this empirical challenge in several ways.  First, we use firm- and industry-level 
data to increase the power of the tests.  Second, we use numerous control variables to proxy for a 
                                                 
5 The international press is rife with coverage about corruption, ranging from drug-enforcement problems in 
Mexico, to Russia’s vast gray economy.  Corruption has been the subject of recent speeches by numerous world 
leaders, including Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng, South Korea’s Kim Young Sam, and the president of the World 
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variety of other country-level factors that are correlated with corruption.  Third, we use an 
instrumental variable approach to parse out the effect of corruption.  After controlling for other 
factors, we document a significant empirical relation between country-level corruption and cross-
national corporate valuation.  While these results likely understate the total effect of corruption, 
they do provide support for the view that corruption has significant economic consequences. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review the vast 
literature on corruption, and discuss the theoretical link between corruption and shareholder 
value.  In Section 3, we address issues in international valuation and the theory that underpins 
our empirical tests.  This section also describes our sample, and motivates the various 
explanatory characteristics used in the study.  Section 4 reports our empirical findings.  Finally, 
in Section 5 we conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings. 
 
2. Corruption and Shareholder Value 
In this section, we define the concept of corruption, discuss prior research on the determinants of 
corruption, and address measurement issues.  We also discuss how the level of corruption in a 
country might affect corporate values. 
2.1 What is Corruption? 
Corruption is most commonly defined as the misuse of public office for private gain 
((Klitgaard (1991; page 221), Transparency International (1995; pages 57-58), and Shleifer 
and Vishny (1993; page 599)).  It is a concept that extends beyond the act of bribery to 
encompass a wide range of behavior associated with the exercise of discretionary power in 
the public sector.  Because every government in the world spends money, collects taxes, and 
otherwise regulates its citizens, all are susceptible to corruption.  However, the incidence of 
corruption, and the prominent forms that it takes, varies across countries.6   
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Bank.  For information on the efforts of the World Bank and IMF to combat corruption, see Rose-Ackerman (1997, 
page 93). 
6 Elliott (1997) highlights the prominence of corruption in the global economy, and provides many examples.   
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2.2 What gives rise to corruption? 
What gives rise to corruption?  Most studies that address this subject frame the discussion in 
terms of a balancing act between the expected cost of a corrupt act and its expected benefits.   
For example, Jain (2001, 77) observed: 
 
[The] existence of corruption requires three elements to co-exist.  First, someone 
must have discretionary power.  Broadly defined, this power would include 
authority to design regulations, as well as to administer them.  Second, there must 
be economic rent associated with this power…Third, the legal/judicial system 
must offer sufficiently low probability of detection and/or penalty for the 
wrongdoing.  In an extension of Becker’s (1968) ‘crime and punishment’ 
argument, the first two elements combine to create incentives for corruption and 
the third acts as a deterrent.  Corruption occurs when higher rents are associated 
with misuse of the discretionary powers, net of any illegal payments and penalties 
associated with such a misuse.   
 
In one of the most comprehensive studies on the subject, Treisman (2000) argues that this 
cost-benefit analysis should consider social and psychological, as well as financial, factors.  
He examines the relation between indices of “perceived corruption” (discussed in the next 
subsection) and a country’s historical, cultural, economic, and political characteristics.   
 
He finds that countries with lower corruption tend to be largely Protestant, former British 
colonies, have higher per capita income, a common law (versus civil law) legal system, a 
high ratio of imports to GDP, long exposure to democracy, and a unitary form of 
government.  The direction of causality on economic development (per capita income) runs 
both ways.  Treisman (2000) argues that these findings are broadly consistent with the theory 
on the expected costs and benefits of committing a corrupt act.7 
 
                                                 
7 Treisman (2000) als o tests and finds a number of factors nominated by theory to be insignificant in explaining 
corruption.  Among these are: the relative salaries of the public sector, the degree of political stability, the 
endowment of natural resources, the degree of state intervention in the economy (in the form of regulation or 
taxation), and the level of ethnic diversity. 
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Treisman’s findings corroborate well with results from other studies.  For example, La Porta 
et al. (1999) find that less developed countries, countries with higher Catholic or Muslim 
populations, and countries with French or socialist laws (in contrast to common laws), tend to 
have inferior measures of government performance, including higher corruption.  Similarly, 
Rose-Ackerman (2001) shows that while the current degree of democracy is unimportant in 
explaining corruption, corruption does decrease after longer exposure to a democratic 
structure.   
 
In sum, prior studies find that the level of corruption in a country is a function of its historical, 
religious, and cultural roots, and that corruption is also related to the level of economic 
development in the country, as well as its legal and governmental system.  Taken individually, 
these variables do not appear to be prime candidates in explaining international equity values.  
However, we include a number of these measures as controls or instrumental variables in our 
tests.  
2.3 How is Corruption measured? 
Most recent studies on corruption have used indices of “perceived” corruption prepared by 
business risk analysts and polling organizations, based on survey responses of businessmen and 
local residences.  Among the most comprehensive indices are the Business International (BI) 
ratings, the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) index, and the Transparency International 
(TI) composite corruption score.8   
 
While these ratings are by definition “subjective”, there are compelling reasons to take the 
patterns they reveal seriously.  First, the ratings tend to be highly correlated with each other.  
Different organizations using different techniques derive ratings that are similar and do not 
change much from year to year.  As Treisman (2000) observed, indices of relative corruption 
constructed from the surveys of business people operating in specific countries turn out to be 
highly correlated with cross-national polls of the inhabitants of these countries.  This reduces the 
chances that the results reflect the biases of a particular monitoring organization.   
 
                                                 
8  See Jain (2000), pages 76-77 for a more complete listing. 
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Second, empirical work confirms that these subjective ratings are correlated with a wide variety 
of economic and social phenomena.  However subjective these evaluations might be, they appear 
to have explanatory power in many contexts.  For example, Mauro (1995) shows that corruption 
lowers investment and impedes economic growth.  Wei (1997) finds that an increase in 
corruption lowers the amount of direct foreign investment.  Corruption also reduces government 
tax revenue (Ul Haque and Sahay (1996), Tanzi and Davoodi (1997)), Johnson et al. (1999)) and 
decreases spending on operations and maintenance, such as medicine and textbooks (Tanzi and 
Davoodi (1997)).   
 
In more recent studies, measures of relative corruption have been linked to other social and 
economic phenomena.  For example, higher corruption is associated with rising military 
spending (Gupta, de Mello, and Sharan (2000)), higher child mortality rates and higher student 
dropout rates (Gupta et al. (2001)).  Higher corruption also increases the size of the unofficial 
economy (Johnson et al. (1998)), and is related to higher relative spread on sovereign bonds 
(Ciocchini, Durbin and Ng (2002)) and Hall and Yago (2000)).   
 
In short, although these corruption indices are subjective measures of individuals’ perception, 
they appear to capture an important conceptual construct, which manifests itself in a variety of 
other forms in society.  The picture that emerges from this literature is that the social and 
economic effects of corruption are significant, pervasive and generally negative.     
 
In this study, we used four annual issues (1995 through 1998) of the Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) prepared by Transparency International.  The CPI is a “poll of polls”, reflecting composite 
information from up to 12 individual surveys and ratings.   The respondents are business people, 
risk analysts, and the general public.  A country must be covered by at least three surveys to be 
included in the CPI.  We chose this index because of its comprehensive coverage, and because it 
incorporates the results of other major indices.  A copy of the index, as well as details on how it 
is constructed can be obtained from the Transparency International web site 
(www.transparency.org).9  
                                                 
9 As a robustness check, we replicated our tests using the corruption rankings from the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) and obtained very similar results.  The ICRG index is among the surveys included in the CPI.  
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The Transparency International CPI index is scaled so that it can range from 1 to 10.  This index 
is a measure of “cleanness” rather than “corruption,” because more corrupt countries receive a 
lower CPI score.  Throughout this study, we reverse the coding by subtracting the CPI from 10, 
so that our measure of corruption ranges from 9 (extremely corrupt) to 0 (extremely clean).  
2.4 Corruption and Shareholder Value 
The dependent variables for our analysis are the price-to-book (PB) and price-to-earnings (PE) 
ratios of individual firms.  Valuation theory provides guidance on the economic determinants of 
these ratios.  In the next section, we develop this theory in much greater detail.  However, it 
might be useful to first assess how corruption might affect shareholder value in broad terms. 
 
As we will show in the next section, the price investors are willing to pay for a firm’s earnings 
(or book value) is primarily driven by the firm’s expected profitability, future growth (g) and 
level of risk (i.e., its cost of capital (r)).  The theoretical literature identifies at least three 
channels through which corruption can affect these economic drivers of firm value. 
  
First, corruption can drive up price and lower the level and quality of government output and 
services (Shleifer and Vishny (1993)), including those services that have a direct effect on 
corporate activities.  As we show later, higher corruption is indeed associated with higher 
inflation.  Presumably in such environments investors will demand a higher expected return on 
their capital.  A higher cost of capital has the effect of lowering the price paid per unit of 
earnings or asset, thus lowering P/E and P/B ratios.   
 
Second, corruption can reduce investment and retard economic growth.  The empirical evidence 
shows that higher corruption is associated with lower investments and economic development 
(Mauro (1998), Kaufmann et al. (1999b)) and lower direct foreign investment (Wei (1997)).  
Growth is, of course, one of the key drivers of corporate values.  To the extent that corruption 
lowers expected growth (g), we would anticipate that firms in more corrupt countries will trade 
at lower P/E and P/B multiples. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999a, 1999b) criticize the Transparency International measure, and 
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Third, corruption can reduce legal protection of shareholders, particularly minority shareholders.  
In many countries, large publicly traded firms are not widely held, but have controlling 
shareholders.  These shareholders have the power to expropriate minority shareholders and 
creditors, within the constraints imposed by law.  Corruption reduces the effectiveness of 
regulatory oversight against this type of expropriation, which can lower the value of a firm to 
shareholders.   
 
Consistent with this scenario, La Porta et al. (LLSV, 2001) show that firms from countries with 
better investor protection laws have higher Tobin’s q.  Their study uses the origin of a country’s 
laws (Common versus Civil) and the index of specific legal rules as indicators of shareholder 
protection.  As we have seen earlier, the origin of a country’s law is also correlated with 
corruption.  It is difficult to distinguish whether corruption per se, or shareholder protection, is 
the primary theoretical construct that accounts for the results in La Porta et al. (2001).   
 
Our sense is that corruption encompasses a broader set of social behavior than is captured by 
shareholder protection.   For example, public corruption is likely to be mirrored by similar 
behavior in the private sector.  To the extent that unethical behavior in general increases 
contracting and monitoring costs, the adverse effect of corruption on corporate values can extend 
beyond legal protection of shareholders.  In later tests, we evaluate the incremental effect of 
corruption by including such variables as the LLSV index of shareholder protection (Antidir), the 
efficiency of the judicial system (Judsys), and the level of Accounting Standards (Accstand) as 
control variables. 
 
As discussed earlier, the pervasive nature of corruption and the insidious nature of its effect on 
other economic variables, can pose a significant challenge to empirical researchers.  In addition 
to the three control variables just described, we include a large number of other related country-
level measures: Inflation, real GDP growth (GDPg), import as a percentage of GDP 
(Import/GDP), GDP per capita (GDP/cap), the country’s stock market beta (Beta), as well as its 
                                                                                                                                                             
advocate an alternative estimation technique.  However, their measure is not available for periods before 1997.   
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currency exchange beta (Ex_beta).  To the extent that these variables are affected by corruption, 
our results will understate the total effect of corruption on firm valuation.   
 
3. Valuation Theory and Model Estimation 
 
The dependent variables for our analysis are the price-to-book (PB) and price-to-earnings (PE) 
ratios of individual firms.  In this section, we present the valuation theory that identifies the 
economic determinants of these ratios.  We also motivate the empirical constructs used to 
estimate our valuation model.  Our discussion extends the multiple-based valuation approach in 
Bhojraj and Lee (2001) to an international setting.   
3.1 Theoretical Determinants of Market Multiples 
Valuation theory shows that explicit expressions can be derived for many market multiples using 
little more than the dividend discount model (DDM) and a few additional assumptions.  For 
example, the residual income formula allows us to re-express the discounted dividend model in 
terms of the price-to-book ratio:10 
 
  ,   (1) 
 
where Pt*  is the present value of expected dividends at time t, Bt+i  = expected book value at 
time t+i; r = cost of equity capital; and ROEt+i = return-on-equity, the expected after-tax return 
on book equity for period t+i.   
 
This equation shows that a firm’s price-to-book ratio is a function of its expected return-on-
equity (ROE), its cost-of-capital (r), and its future growth rate in book value (Bt+i/Bt).  Firms that 
have higher expected ROE, lower r, and higher growth rates, will trade at higher price-to-book 
ratios.  In other words, the primary drivers of the P/B ratio should be its expected ROE, its cost 
of capital, and its expected rate of growth. 
                                                 
10 This equation can be derived from the DDM with the additional assumption of the “clean surplus relation” (Bt = 
Bt-1 + NIt – DIVt).  The resulting formula, often referred to as a “residual income” valuation model, has been the 
subject of considerable recent interest in the accounting literature.  See Feltham and Ohlson (1995) or Lee (1999) 
and the references therein for details.  
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Accounting diversity problems across countries are minimized by the complementary nature of 
P/B and ROE.  In brief, firms in countries with more conservative accounting practices will have 
lower book values (relative to their economic value).  This results in higher P/B ratios, but also 
higher ROE measures.  Therefore, at least in theory, this model is robust to differences in 
accounting practices across countries.11 
 
In the same spirit, it is not difficult to derive the price-to-earnings ratio in terms of expected 
growth rates, the dividend payout ratio, and the cost of capital.  In the case of a stable growth 
firm, the price-to-earnings ratio can be expressed as: 
 
   ,    (2) 
 
where Pt*  is the present value of future dividends at time t, Et  = earnings at time t; k is a 
constant dividend payout ratio (dividends as a percentage of earnings);  r = cost of equity capital; 
and g is the expected earnings growth rate.   
 
In the more general case, we can model the firm’s growth in terms of an initial period (say n 
years) of high growth, followed by a period of more stable growth in perpetuity.  Under this 
assumption, a firm’s price-to-earnings ratio can be expressed as: 
 
,  (3) 
 
 
 
where Pt*  is the present value of future dividends at time t, Et  = earnings at time t; k is a 
constant payout ratio; r = cost of equity capital; g1 is the initial earnings growth rate, which is 
applied for n years; and g2 is the constant growth rate applicable from period n+1 onwards. 
                                                 
11 The theoretical model features an infinite horizon forecast of future cash flows.   In practice, valuation models 
involve finite horizon forecasts, which introduce estimation errors that could be a function of a country’s accounting 
practices.  See Frankel and Lee (1999) for more details . 
 13 
 
Equation (3) shows that a firm’s P/E ratio should be a function of its dividend payout ratio (k), 
expected growth rates (g1 and g2), and cost of capital (r).  If the market value of equity 
approximates the present value of expected cash flows, these variables should explain a 
significant portion of the cross-sectional variation in the P/E ratio.  In the tests that follow, we 
employ a multiple regression model to explain cross-national P/B and P/E ratios.  The 
explanatory variables we use in the model are empirical proxies for the key elements in the right-
hand-side of Equations (1) and (3). 
3.2 Sample Selection 
Our initial sample of firms is derived from the Worldscope database.  To complement the 
corruption index data from Transparency International, we focused our analysis on the 1995 to 
1998 time period.12  We required that each firm’s home country (both country of origin and 
country of domicile) be clearly identified in the Worldscope database, and that the country is 
included in the Transparency International CPI rankings.13   
 
We obtained the total market capitalization for each firm based on closing market prices as of 
June 30th of each year.  In addition, we required the availability of the following data items, 
measured as of the most recent fiscal year end: total common equity, total long-term and short-
term debt, operating income, total assets, research and development expenditure, fiscal year-end 
date, and currency denomination.14  In addition, we required each firm to have a one-year-ahead 
and a two-year-ahead consensus earnings forecast in the I/B/E/S International database as of the 
June statistical period each year.  We derive a forecasted growth rate from these two earnings 
forecasts (see Appendix B for details).15  
                                                 
12 We also had 1999 data.  However, the introduction of the Euro in January 1999 complicated the computation of 
P/B and P/E ratios (accounting variables and prices were not always in the same currency).  To avoid these 
problems, we limited our analysis to pre-1999 data. 
13 Because of their peculiar status, American Deposit Receipts (ADR’s) are excluded.  There are three ways by 
which we identify the ADR’s.  First, Worldscope marks some firms with an ADR indicator.  Second, the names of 
some firms are clearly labeled as ADR’s.  Third, some firms have a country of origin that is different from their 
country of domicile.  We exclude all three. 
14 To ensure that the accounting variables are available to the public and are reflected in firm price, the market price 
in June is matched to accounting data from a fiscal year that ended in the prior January or earlier. 
15 In an earlier draft, we also used a separate sample based on historical growth rates to proxy for expected growth.  
Firms in the historical growth sample were required to have three past years of operating income available from 
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We exclude firms with negative common equity, negative current earnings, negative one-year-
ahead forecasted earnings and negative earnings in year t+2.  In addition, to facilitate the 
estimation of a robust model, we rank firms annually on various attributes and exclude 
observations in the top and bottom 3% by price-to-book, price-earning, leverage, return-on-
equity, and forecasted growth rates.  After these filters, we obtained 19,979 firm-year 
observations.   
3.3 Model Estimation 
Our research design involves the use of regression models that attempt to explain cross-national 
variations in P/E and P/B ratios.  For this purpose, we compute four firm-level, and two industry-
level, explanatory variables.  We are guided in the choice of these variables by the valuation 
equations discussed earlier.  Following the methodology developed by Bhojraj and Lee (2001), 
we attempt to estimate relatively simple models that capture the key theoretical constructs of 
growth, risk, and profitability.   
 
Specifically, our model includes the following variables, which are also summarized and 
described in more detail in Appendix B: 
 
Indpb – The harmonic mean of the price-to-book multiple for all the firms with the same two-
digit SIC code for a given year.16  This variable controls for industry-wide factors, such as 
growth rates and level of risk, and we expect it to be positively correlated with current year firm-
specific PB ratios.  It is used only in the PB regressions. 
 
Indpe – The harmonic mean of the price-to-earnings multiple for all firms with the same two-
digit SIC code for a given year.  It controls for industry-wide factors and is only used in the PE 
regressions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Worldscope.  Since the number of observations was similar and the key results are unaffected, we do not report 
these results separately.  
16  We use the harmonic means of industry PB and PE ratios, that is, the inverse of the average of inversed ratios, 
because they are more robust results than industry medians in these applications (See Baker and Ruback (1999)).   
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Roe – Return on equity.  This variable is net income before extraordinary items scaled by the end 
of period common equity.  We expect this profitability measure to be a key driver of cross-
sectional variations in the PB ratio.  It is only used in the PB regression.   
 
Forecastg – Forecasted earnings growth based on I/B/E/S estimates.  This variable is computed 
as the percentage increase implicit in the two-year-ahead forecast relative to the one-year-ahead 
forecast.  Higher growth firms merit higher PE and PB ratios. 
 
Lev – Book leverage.  This variable is computed as total debt expressed as a percentage of total 
book equity.  Firms with no reported debt are assigned a value of zero.  Levered firms are riskier, 
ceteris paribus.  Moreover, Gebhardt et al. (2001) suggest this measure is correlated with a firm’s 
implied cost of capital.  We therefore expect this variable to be negatively correlated with the 
two dependent variables. 
 
R&D – Total research and development expenditures divided by sales.  Firms with higher R&D 
expenditures tend to understate current profitability relative to future profitability.  To the extent 
that this variable captures expected earnings growth (and profitability) beyond Forecastg (and 
current ROE), we expect it to be positively correlated with the PE and PB ratios. 
 
In addition to these industry and firm level variables, we also include seven country-level metrics 
as control variables:   
 
Inflation and GDPg – These two macro-economic variables are suggested by valuation theory 
as potential factors in international valuation.  Inflation is the annual inflation rate and GDPg is 
the annual real growth rate for each country.  We expect inflation to be negatively correlated 
with firm values (see, for example, Nissim and Penman, 2001) and real GDP growth to be 
positively correlated.  To ensure these measures were available to the public as of June each 
year, we used the prior year’s numbers. 
 
Judsys, Antidir, Acctstand – These three variables were featured in La Porta et al. (1998) as 
measures of the level of corporate governance and protection of minority shareholder rights.  
 16 
Judsys is a measure of the efficacy of the judicial system, ranging from 0 (least efficient) to 10 
(most efficient).  Antidir is an aggregate index developed by La Porta et al. (1998) to capture 
shareholder rights within a country.  Acctstand is a crude measure of the quality of financial 
reporting in a country, based on the inclusion or omission of 90 items in seven categories.   
 
Import/GDP and GDP/cap – We also include two variables identified by past studies to be 
correlated with corruption.  Import/GDP is the proportion of annual country imports divided by 
the annual country GDP, which prior studies found is positively correlated with corruption at the 
country level (Treisman (2000), Gupta et al. (2001)).  GDP/cap, a measure of the wealth level of 
a country, is also correlated with corruption (Treisman (2000)).  To ensure these measures are 
publicly available as of June 30th, we used measures that pertain to the prior calendar year.  
Although these two variables are not nominated by valuation, we include them as control 
variables in our regression.  We also use them as instrumental variables in our two-stage least 
square regression. 
 
Beta and Ex_Beta – Finally, we include two measures of country-level systematic risk.  Market 
Beta (Beta) refers to the beta of the country stock index relative to the Morgan Stanley Capital 
Index (MSCI) world stock index.  Exchange rate beta (Ex_beta) refers to the beta of the country 
stock index relative to an exchange rate index of the US dollar.  To compute Beta and Ex_beta, 
we use the two-factor model: 
 
   
The dependent variable is the monthly dollar return on the stock market index where the firm is 
located.  We use returns on Morgan Stanley Capital Index (International Financial Corporation) 
country indices as proxies for country stock returns in industrial (developing) countries.  The two 
factors on the right hand side of the regression are (i) the market factor (rm – rf), which is the 
excess dollar return of the value-weighted MSCI world market portfolio, and (ii) the currency 
factor (D e), which is the return on the US dollar vis-à-vis the other six countries in the G7 
(weighted by the relative stock-market capitalization).  An increase in the index implies US 
dollar depreciated against the basket of currencies.  The rolling 60-month index returns is used; 
Beta and the Ex_beta are the estimated coefficients from this regression.  
ti
e
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To recap, our research design involves estimating a series of regressions of either the PB or PE 
ratio on these control variables, together with the corruption variable (Corrupt), based on the 
reported CPI figure.  Transparency International releases its annual CPI result around July of 
each year.  This measure ranges between 9 (highly corrupt) and 0 (highly clean).  Appendix B 
contains further details on how each of these variables is calculated. 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Appendix A presents descriptive statistics on the Transparency International data for our sample 
of 46 countries.  The countries are listed in rank order by their average corruption score over the 
four annual surveys.  Also reported in this table is the average number of firms per year, the 
standard deviation of the corruption score across different years, the number of surveys used to 
compile that country’s CPI (based on 1998 data) and the standard deviation of the corruption 
score from the different surveys (again based on 1998 data).   
 
Over our sample period, Denmark, New Zealand, and Finland received the best corruption 
rankings while Pakistan, Indonesia, and Venezuela received the worse.  Most of the countries 
were ranked for four years.  Only five countries were ranked for two years or fewer.  The 
average number of firms per year ranged from 1 (Brazil and Venezuela) to 1,690 (United 
States).  The number of surveys used to compile a country’s composite CPI score ranged from 3 
to 12.  The standard deviation of the scores from these surveys ranges from 0.4 (Malaysia) to 1.7 
(Greece).  These standard deviation statistics provide some indication of the degree of agreement 
among surveys as to a country’s relative ranking.   
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the two dependent and sixteen explanatory variables.  
Table values represent the means, standard deviations and various percentiles.  We include one 
observation per firm-year, sampled as of June 30th.  The sample is from 6/1995 to 6/1998.   
Notice that the country-level variables (Corrupt, GDPg, Inflation, GDP/cap, Import/GDP, 
Acctstand, Antidir, Judsys, Beta, and Ex_beta) are common across firms in the same country, 
and the industry-level variables (Indpb and Indpe) are common across firms in the same industry.  
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Overall these statistics appear reasonable, with no indication that data errors are likely to be a 
serious problem. 
4.2  Pairwise Correlations 
Tables 2 reports the pairwise correlations among firm and industry level variables.  Table values 
in the upper triangle are Spearman rank correlation coefficients, table values in the lower triangle 
are Pearson correlation coefficients.  We compute the correlation table annually and report the 
time-series mean of the annual correlations.  We report statistical significance on the basis of the 
consistency of the cross-sectional correlations over the four sample years. 
 
The price-to-book ratio (PB) is correlated with all the other variables in the expected direction.  
In particular, ROE is highly positively correlated with PB.  PB is also positively correlated with 
both industry-level variables (Indpe and Indpb).  Consistent with theory, PB is negatively 
correlated with Lev and positively correlated with R&D as well as forecasted growth. 
 
The price-to-earnings (PE) ratio is also generally correlated with the other variables in the 
direction predicted by theory.  In particular, as expected, firms with higher forecasted growth 
trade at higher PE multiples.  PE is also positively correlated with R&D expense and industrial 
multiples (Indpb and Indpe).  PE is negatively correlated with ROE, but some of the correlation 
is spurious (current earning appears in the numerator for the ROE calculation).  Overall, Table 2 
shows that most of the explanatory variables nominated by valuation theory operate as expected 
in the international setting.17   
 
Table 3 reports the pairwise correlations among the country-level variables.  This table illustrates 
the difficulty confronted by researchers seeking to isolate the effect of corruption.  Four variables 
are significantly correlated with Corrupt: GDP/cap, Judsys, and Acctstand are negatively 
correlated, and Inflation is positively correlated.  A fifth variable, Import/GDP, also exhibits 
                                                 
17 To check the robustness of these relationships (and to ensure that our results are not driven entirely by firms from 
the United States), we also examined the correlation coefficients for the three countries with the largest number of 
firms in the sample: the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan.  The results (not reported) generally confirm 
the findings in the overall sample.  In each country, forecasted growth and industry multiples are positively 
correlated with firm level PE and PB ratios.  ROE is always positively correlated with PB and R&D is always 
positively correlated with both dependent variables.  The only exception is book leverage, which is positively 
correlated with PE and PB among Japanese firms. 
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marginal negative correlation with corruption.  In short, more corrupt regimes tend to have 
weaker judicial systems, less transparent accounting standards, higher inflation, lower GDP per 
capita, and lower import as a ratio of GDP.  Our challenge will be to disentangle, as much as 
possible, the effect of corruption on corporate values.   
 
4.3 Regression Analysis 
Table 4 reports the results of a series of pooled time-series cross-sectional regressions estimated 
using data available as of June of each year.  The dependent variable in these regressions is either 
the PB ratio (Panel A) or the PE ratio (Panel B).  The independent variables are as described in 
the previous section.  Table values represent estimated coefficients, based on a model with 
annual dummies and random country effects.  T-statistics are reported in parentheses.  Reported 
in the bottom rows are adjusted R-squares, the Hausman Chi-square statistic, and the number of 
observations per year.   
 
We begin with a random effect model because it allows us to estimate the correlation matrix 
taking into account the country-level cross-correlations.  The main advantage of this approach is 
that it produces a more efficient estimate than a fixed effect model.  The main disadvantage is 
that the estimates are likely to be inconsistent. The random effect model maintains the severe 
assumption that any unobserved country effects in the error term are uncorrelated to the 
explanatory variables.  In our case, the Hausman test statistics for these regressions show that the 
inconsistency introduced by the random effect model is severe for all four models.  Therefore, 
for the remainder of our study, we use a fixed effect model with a separate dummy for each 
country. 
 
Despite the known inconsistencies, Table 4 results are suggestive of a negative relation between 
Corrupt and firm values.  In Models 1 and 3, we include only firm and industry control variables; 
in Models 2 and 4 we also include Inflation and GDPg.  The results show that the estimated 
coefficient on Corrupt is significantly negative in all four models.  Collectively, these variables 
explain around 40% of the variation in PB, and 10.5% of the variation in PE.  The coefficients on 
the control variables are generally in the expected direction, with the exception of leverage, 
which is not significant for the PB regressions and positive for the PE regressions.  Models 2 and 
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4 show that, consistent with valuation theory, GDPg is positively correlated with the market 
multiples, while Inflation is negatively correlated with these multiples.  The correlation of 
Corrupt with firm values is lower in the presence of GDPg and Inflation, but it remains negative 
and significant in both models. 
 
Table 5 presents the main results for this paper.  In this table, we examine PE and PB ratios using 
a pooled regression with fixed annual and country effects.  For each ratio, we estimate five 
models.  Models 1 and 2 are benchmark estimations, which document the explanatory power of 
firm and industry variables, with and without country and yearly fixed effects.  Model 3 
illustrates the incremental effect of the corruption variable; models 4 and 5 further introduce 
various additional country-level control variables. 
 
Panel A shows that all the firm and industry level variables have the predicted sign.  Even 
without country and annual dummy variables, over 39% of the variation in P/B ratios can be 
explained by Indpb, ROE, R&D, Forecastg, and Lev.  With the addition of country and yearly 
fixed effects, the adjusted r-square increases to 42.5%.  Model 3 shows that Corrupt is 
incrementally important after controlling for the other variables.  Model 4 shows that the 
addition of GDPg and Inflation has little effect on the Corrupt variable.  Finally, Model 5 shows 
that Corrupt survives even with the inclusion of two variables known to be highly correlated with 
country-level corruption (Import/GDP and GDP/cap).  It is worthwhile to note that neither of 
these latter variables is nominated by valuation theory and their explanatory power is probably 
attributable, to a large extent, to Corrupt.  We address this issue later with an instrumental 
variable regression.   
 
Panel B shows that Corrupt is also important in explaining PE ratios.  As expected, PE is 
positively correlated with R&D, forecasted growth, and Indpe.  Somewhat surprisingly, higher 
levered firms also receive higher PE multiples.  This reversal of the univariate relation is perhaps 
due to the fact that forecastg does not fully incorporate the value of expected growth firm values.  
More importantly, the corruption measure is negative and significant in all three models in which 
it appears.  Apparently firms from less corrupt countries earn higher PE multiples, controlling for 
the other factors. 
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It might be useful to consider the economic magnitude of these estimated coefficients.  Panel A 
shows that a one unit increase in the corruption index corresponds to approximately a 0.20 
decrease in the PB ratio.  Panel B shows that a one unit increase in the corruption index 
corresponds to approximately a decrease of 3.1 in the PE ratio.  In other words, an increase in the 
corruption level from that of Singapore (Corrupt score of 1.05) to that of Mexico (Corrupt score 
of 6.89) corresponds to a decrease of 18.1 in the PE ratio, and a decrease of 1.17 in the PB ratio.  
4.4 Further Robustness Checks 
Since Corrupt is a country-level measure, its ability to explain firm-level variations in PE and PB 
is likely to be affected by the inclusion of other country-level variables.  The models we 
estimated already include country-level indicator variables, which control for unidentified 
variation at the country level.  In addition, we have included country-level variables such as: 
Inflation, GDPg, GDP/cap, and Import/GDP.  However, it is still possible that Corrupt is serving 
as a proxy for another omitted country-level variable.  Obviously, we run the risk of over 
controlling and thus eliminating the underlying theoretical construct of interest.  Nevertheless, in 
this section, we explore variations in the basic model. 
 
In Table 5, we did not include the three corporate control and shareholder right variables (Judsys, 
Antidir, and Acctstand), because these measures do not change from year-to-year.  As a result, 
their explanatory power is subsumed by the country-level fixed effect variables.  However, it is 
possible that these variables have differential effects on firm value across the four years in our 
sample.  In Table 6, we conduct additional robustness checks that consider this possibility, as 
well as several instrumental variable regressions that attempt to disentangle the effect of 
corruption from that of GDP/cap and Import/GDP. 
 
In Table 6, we introduce interaction variables created by multiplying the year dummies with the 
three corporate control and shareholder rights variables: Judsys, Acctstand, and Antidir.  The F-
statistics and P-values on these variables show that introducing a time-varying component 
modestly improves the overall fit.  More importantly, Model 1 shows that the effect of corruption 
on PB (Panel A) and PE (Panel B) is unaffected by these perturbations.  In fact, compared to 
Table 5, the estimated coefficients on Corrupt are slightly more negative for both PE and PB. 
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Model 2 of Table 6 includes Import/GDP and GDP/cap in the regression.  Neither variable is 
nominated by valuation theory per se, but both have been identified with corruption in past 
studies.  We find that firms in countries with higher GDP/cap and higher Import/GDP have 
higher valuation multiples.  The estimated coefficient on the corruption variable is smaller after 
adding these measures, but it remains significant for both the PB and the PE regression. 
 
In Models 3 and 4, we attempt to parse out the effect of Corrupt using Import/GDP and GDP/cap 
as instrumental variables.  The first-stage results show a high degree of fit (the adjusted r-square, 
reported in the table, is over 0.97), and the second stage results show that the fitted variable for 
corruption is strongly correlated with both PE and PB.  If we believe that corruption has some 
effect on both GDP/cap and Import/GDP, then these results suggest that our earlier findings 
likely understate the effect of corruption on firm values. 
 
As a further robustness check, we examine the effect of including proxies of country-level 
systematic risk in our analysis.  Table 7 reports the results when we include a country’s market 
beta (Beta) and currency exchange beta (Ex_beta).  However, a country’s market beta (Beta) has 
no significant incremental power in explaining PB ratios, and, contrary to theory, it exhibits a 
positive correlation with the PE ratio.  We find that Ex_beta is negatively correlated with market 
multiples.  More importantly, the coefficient on Corrupt remains significantly negative even with 
the inclusion of Beta and Ex_beta, as well as GDPg and Inflation.   
4.5 Additional Analyses 
So far, our findings show that the Corrupt variable is negatively correlated with market multiples 
after controlling for a wide set of other variables.  In this subsection, we attempt to shed more 
light on the source of the correlation.   
 
 Table 8 examines how corruption affects firm valuation.  In this table, we introduce interaction 
terms between corruption and several firm-level value drivers.  Specifically, we define HiCorr = 
1 if a firm is from a country that received a Corrupt score of above 5.5 on average over time, and 
0 otherwise.  Similarly, we define LoCorr = 1 if a firm is from a country that received on average 
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a Corrupt score of below 2.5, and 0 otherwise.  These cutoff values partition our sample into 
roughly 3 equal-sized sets of countries: 15 low-, 16 medium-, and 15 high-corruption countries. 
 
We are interested in understanding how corruption affects the usefulness of current profitability 
(ROE), R&D expenditures (R&D), and forecasted growth (Forecastg) as drivers of firm value.  
For example, if current profitability erodes quickly in highly corrupt regimes, we would expect a 
negative relation between HiCorr*ROE and PB.  Similarly, if the benefits of current R&D or 
forecasted growth is lower for highly corrupt countries, we would expect negative coefficients on 
HiCorr*R&D and HiCorr*Forecastg, respectively.  Conversely, if most of the effect derives 
from low corruption regimes, we would expect positive coefficients on the LoCorr interaction 
terms. 
 
Table 8 shows that expected erosion in ROE and forecasted growth in high corruption regimes 
are important in explaining the relation between PB and corruption.  In Panel A, both 
HiCorr*ROE and HiCorr*Forecastg are significantly negative.  The coefficient on CorrLo*R&D 
and CorrLo*Forecastg are also marginally positive, suggesting that per unit of R&D expense and 
forecasted growth is worth more in low corruption countries.  These results are consistent with 
the view that the greater uncertainty (or contracting costs) associated with higher corruption 
reduces the corporate value of R&D expenditures, current ROE, and forecasted growth.  The 
results for the PE ratio (Panel B) are generally not significant.  ROE is not included in the model 
but we find some evidence (in Model 2) that HiCorr*Forecastg is significantly negative.    
 
Table 9 conducts separate regressions for industrial and developing countries.  Because 
corruption is correlated with per capita GDP, we know that this test will weaken the explanatory 
power of the corruption variable in both sub-samples.  However, we are interested in 
understanding the robustness of the results in both types of economies.  To construct this table, 
we use the World Bank’s International Financial Corporation (IFC) classification of Industrial 
and Developing countries.  21 (25) out of 46 of the countries in our sample were deemed by the 
IFC to be an Industrial (Developing) country.   
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As expected, Table 9 shows that the effect is weaker in both parts of the split sample.  Corruption 
continues to be negatively correlated with both PB and PE in industrial countries, but has no 
incremental explanatory power for market multiples in the emerging country sub-sample.  Part of 
the result is due to a lack of power in the developing country sub-sample, as we have only 3,268 
to 3,418 observations.  Moreover, the relative corruption in these countries tends to be similar, 
further reducing the power of this variable.  In any event, it is clear from this table that our result 
is not driven by firms from a handful of developing countries. 
 
Finally, Table 10 reports the results of estimations based on a maximum of 100 firms per 
country.  One concern is that our results might be driven by a preponderance of firms from a few 
large countries.  To construct this table, we limited our sample to the top 100 firms from each 
country by market capitalization.  As expected, this restriction severely curtailed our sample (the 
total sample size decreases by more than 50%).  Nevertheless, Table 10 shows that even in this 
highly restrictive sample, corruption is negatively correlated with firm values.  As expected, both 
the statistical significance and the estimated coefficients are substantially lower than reported 
earlier, but the key inferences remain similar. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This study integrates the valuation literature in finance with a vast literature in political science 
and economics on corruption.  Valuation theory demonstrates that the key economic drivers of 
firm value are growth, profitability and risk.  However, little is known about how these drivers 
are affected by country-level factors in cross-national settings.  In particular, we have no 
evidence on how corruption might affect international valuation. 
 
As we demonstrate, the theoretical literature on corruption identifies at least three channels 
through which corruption might affect these economic drivers.  First, corruption can drive up 
price and lower the level and quality of government output and services (Shleifer and Vishny 
(1993)), including those services that have a direct effect on corporate activities.  Second, 
corruption can reduce investment and retard economic growth (Mauro (1998), Wei (1997), 
Kaufmann et al. (1999)).  Finally, corruption can reduce legal protection of shareholders, 
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particularly minority shareholders (LaPorta et al. (2001)).  Shareholders will demand a higher 
rate of return, on average, to compensate for this risk. 
 
These arguments suggest that firms from more corrupt countries will trade at lower PE and PB 
multiples.  Using firm-level data from 46 countries, we test this conjecture.  Our tests show that 
firms from more (less) corrupt countries trade at significantly lower (higher) market multiples.  
This result is robust to the inclusion of many control variables suggested by valuation theory.  In 
our primary estimations, we find that, on average, an increase in the corruption level from that of 
Singapore to that of Mexico corresponds to a decrease of 18.1 in the PE ratio, and a decrease of 
1.17 in the PB ratio. 
 
Although our corruption measures relate to a public sector phenomenon, this behavior is 
likely to be mirrored in private sector dealings as well.  To our knowledge, the extent to 
which corruption in the public sector reflects corruption in the private sector has not been 
studied.  However, if these two forms of corruption are positively correlated, it seems likely 
that both will affect contracting and monitoring costs within a country.  The robustness of the 
corruption measure as an explanatory variable for international valuation, after controlling 
for many other variables, suggests to us that it might capture something beyond public sector 
misconduct.  It is possible that our results reflect a broader phenomenon related to the cost of 
unethical conduct in general, both public and private.  In essence, when trust cannot be 
assumed, contracting is more costly, and firm valuations are adversely affected.  We regard 
this as in interesting area for further research. 
 
As a minimum, our results suggest that a country’s level of corruption has significant economic 
consequences for the shareholder value of its firms.  These findings add to the growing literature 
on the effects of corruption.  They also demonstrate how valuation techniques developed using 
data from the United States might be extended to an international setting.  Given the number of 
country-level control variables included in this analysis, it is unlikely that the empirical relation 
we report is due to correlated omitted variables.  In fact, we believe it is more likely that the 
effect we document understates the true impact of corruption on corporate values across 
international boundaries. 
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Appendix A: Sample countries ranked by corruption score 
 
 Country Sample 
Period 
Average no. 
of firms per 
year 
Average 
Corruption 
Score 
Standard 
Deviation of 
Corruption 
Across Years 
No. of 
surveys used 
in CPI 
(1998) 
Standard 
Deviation 
across surveys 
(1998) 
1 Denmark 1995-1998 77 0.35 0.32 9 0.7 
2 New Zealand 1995-1998 33 0.60 0.11 8 0.7 
3 Finland 1995-1998 42 0.69 0.23 9 0.5 
4 Sweden 1995-1998 95 0.80 0.24 9 0.5 
5 Canada 1997-1998 105 0.97 0.13 9 0.5 
6 Singapore 1995-1998 90 1.05 0.24 10 1.0 
7 Netherlands 1995-1998 95 1.14 0.16 9 0.7 
8 Norway 1995-1998 40 1.15 0.15 9 0.7 
9 Switzerland 1995-1998 81 1.24 0.10 10 0.6 
10 Australia 1995-1998 117 1.26 0.10 8 0.7 
11 United Kingdom 1995-1998 598 1.52 0.18 10 0.5 
12 Ireland 1995-1998 25 1.63 0.14 10 1.4 
13 Germany 1995-1998 164 1.87 0.14 10 0.4 
14 United States 1995-1998 1690 2.36 0.10 8 0.9 
15 Israel 1996-1998 6 2.41 0.36 9 1.4 
16 Austria 1995-1998 37 2.54 0.19 9 0.8 
17 Hong Kong 1995-1998 64 2.70 0.30 12 1.1 
18 Chile 1995-1998 27 3.10 0.68 9 0.9 
19 France 1995-1998 234 3.17 0.15 9 0.6 
20 Japan 1995-1998 356 3.47 0.46 11 1.6 
21 Portugal 1995-1998 27 3.61 0.51 10 1.0 
22 Belgium 1995-1998 53 3.92 0.76 9 1.4 
23 South Africa 1995-1998 65 4.64 0.30 10 0.8 
24 Malaysia 1995-1998 142 4.77 0.13 11 0.4 
25 Spain 1995-1998 75 4.84 0.84 10 1.3 
26 Taiwan 1995-1998 111 4.91 0.12 11 0.7 
27 Poland 1996-1998 40 4.92 0.40 8 1.6 
28 Czech Republic 1997-1998 25 5.00 0.20 9 0.8 
29 Greece 1995-1998 79 5.18 0.48 9 1.7 
30 Hungary 1995-1998 10 5.21 0.40 9 1.2 
31 Peru 1998 10 5.50 -- 6 0.8 
32 South Korea 1995-1998 83 5.55 0.33 12 1.2 
33 Italy 1995-1998 72 5.99 0.83 10 0.8 
34 Brazil 1998 1 6.00 -- 9 0.4 
35 Slovakia 1998 3 6.10 -- 5 1.6 
36 Argentina 1995-1998 13 6.39 0.96 9 0.6 
37 Turkey 1995-1998 22 6.44 0.33 10 1.0 
38 Mexico 1995-1998 15 6.89 0.26 9 0.6 
39 Thailand 1995-1998 56 6.96 0.19 11 0.7 
40 Philippines 1995-1998 38 7.05 0.24 10 1.1 
41 India 1995-1998 17 7.24 0.10 12 0.6 
42 China 1995-1998 31 7.26 0.51 10 0.7 
43 Colombia 1995-1998 6 7.35 0.50 9 0.8 
44 Venezuela 1996-1998 1 7.48 0.19 9 0.8 
45 Indonesia 1995-1998 50 7.67 0.36 10 0.9 
46 Pakistan 1995-1998 15 7.88 0.67 3 1.4 
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Appendix B: Descriptions of Firm and Industry Specific Variables 
 
Variables  Description Calculation 
Firm Level Variables: 
PB Price-to-Book ratio  PB = Market value of equity/Total common equity. 
 
PE Price-to-Earnings ratio  
 
PE = Market value of equity/Net Income before extraordinary 
items. 
Roe Return on Equity Roe = Net Income before extraordinary items*100/Total common 
equity. 
Forecastg  Forecasted earnings growth rate 
(from I/B/E/S) 
Computed from I/B/E/S.  Forecas tg = (Forecasted earnings t+2 - 
Forecasted earnings t+1) *100/Forecasted earningst+1  
Lev Book Leverage Lev = Total debt*100/(Total assets -Total debt). 
Firms with no reported total debt are assigned a value of zero. 
R&D Research & Development-to-Net 
Sales  
R&D = Research & development expense *100 / Net Sales.   
Firms with no reported R&D are assigned a value of zero. 
Industry Level Variables: 
Indpb Industry PB ratio  Harmonic mean of the PB ratio for all firms in the same industry 
(based on 2-digit SIC code). 
Indpe Industry PE ratio  Harmonic mean of the PE ratio for all firms in the same industry 
(based on 2-digit SIC code). 
Country Level Variables: 
Judsys  Efficiency of the Judicial System Measure of the “efficiency and integrity of the legal environment 
as it affects business, particularly foreign firms” produced by the 
country -risk rating agency Business International Corporation.  
This measure ranges from 0 (less efficient) – 10 (more efficient).  
La Porta, et. al. (1998)  
Antidir Anti-director rights  Index of the aggregation of shareholders’ rights ranging from 0 
(less rights) – 5 (more rights).  La Porta, et. al. (1998) 
Acctstand Accounting Standard  Index based on the inclusion or omission of 90 items in 7 
categories: general information, income statements, balance 
sheets, funds flow statements, accounting standards, stock data, 
and special items.  La Porta, et. al. (1998)     
Imports/GDP Imports -to-Gross Domestic Product Annual country imports divided by the annual country gross 
domestic product.  Imports and GDP were collected from 
International Financial Statistics. 
GDP/cap Gross Domestic Product per capita 
(in thousands of US dollars) 
Annual Gross Domestic Product per capita as compiled from the 
International Financial Statistics by the PRS g roup. 
GDPg Annual real GDP Growth Rate (%) Annual real GDP growth as compiled from the International 
Financial Statistics by the PRS group. 
Inflation Annual Inflation Rate (%) 
 
Annual inflation rate as compiled from International Financial 
Statistics data by the PRS group. 
Beta Country stock beta The 5-year rolling beta for returns on country stock indices vis -à-
vis the MSCI world stock returns. 
Ex_beta Country currency beta The 5-year rolling beta for returns on the country stock indices 
vis -à-vis a stock wealth-weighted exchange rate index of US 
dollar. 
Corrupt Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI). 
CPI is a measure of the degree of corruption as perceived by 
business people, risk analysts and the general public.  This 
measure  ranges between 9 (highly corrupt) and 0 (highly clean).  
Each country receives a composite score based on up to 12 
surveys (see Appendix A). 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variables Mean Std Dev 1% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 99% 
PB 2.72 1.97 0.62 0.99 1.41 2.13 3.36 5.25 10.10 
PE 23.33 17.14 5.75 9.58 12.96 18.11 27.53 42.38 94.95 
Roe 13.63 7.68 2.05 4.81 7.97 12.42 17.64 23.92 37.58 
Lev 30.24 30.14 0.00 0.30 6.18 21.76 45.06 72.67 130.33 
R&D 0.99 2.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.08 14.84 
Forecastg 19.07 16.36 -7.89 4.06 9.65 15.38 24.32 38.18 83.72 
Indpb 1.92 0.44 1.17 1.42 1.62 1.84 2.11 2.49 3.25 
Indpe 16.91 2.97 11.85 13.69 14.88 16.52 18.42 21.30 26.37 
Judsys 9.16 1.61 2.50 6.75 9.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Antidir 3.52 1.41 0.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
Acctstand 69.63 6.71 50.00 62.00 65.00 71.00 74.00 78.00 83.00 
Imports/GDP 0.31 0.51 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.22 0.30 0.46 1.49 
GDP/cap 23.36 9.54 0.67 4.91 19.19 26.63 29.46 33.30 40.95 
GDPg 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.10 
Inflation 3.54 6.34 -0.10 1.10 2.00 2.50 3.10 5.80 23.50 
Beta 0.87 0.33 0.31 0.63 0.68 0.78 0.96 1.30 1.82 
Ex_beta 0.06 0.41 -0.77 -0.45 -0.18 0.03 0.29 0.46 1.17 
Corrupt 2.81 1.64 0.40 1.14 1.73 2.39 3.43 5.02 7.37 
 
This table reports the means and various percentiles of the variables used in this study. These 
variables are described in detail in the appendix, briefly, they are: price-to-book ratio (PB), price-
to-earning ratio (PE), return on equity (Roe), forecasted long-term growth (Forecastg), leverage 
(Lev), R&D-to-Net Sales (R&D), industrial harmonic mean of the price-to-book ratio (Indpb), 
industrial mean price-to-earnings (Indpe), efficiency of the judicial system (Judsys), anti-director 
rights (Antidir), accounting standards (Acctstand), annual imports-to-GDP (Imports/GDP), 
annual GDP per capita in dollars (GDP/cap), annual real GDP growth (GDPg), inflation, 
country-level stock return beta (Beta), country-level currency return beta (Ex_beta), and the 
Transparency-International Corruption Index (Corrupt).  We include one observation per firm-
year, sampled as of June 30th each year.  Notice that certain variables (Corruption, Inflation, 
GDPg, GDP/cap, Imports/GDP, Acctstand, Antidir, Judsys) are common across firms in the 
same country, and others (Indpb and Indpe) are common for firms in the same industry.  The 
sample period is from 6/1995 to 6/1998, inclusively.    
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Table 2: Firm-Level Correlations  
 
 PB PE Roe Lev R&D Forecastg Indpb Indpe 
PB      0.47 0.59 -0.15 0.17 0.18 0.35 0.27 
  *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
PE     0.41  -0.37 -0.02 0.13 0.26 0.23 0.30 
 ***  *** ***  *** *** *** 
Roe    0.55 -0.35  -0.15 0.06 -0.04 0.16 0.01 
 *** ***   *** *** ***  
Lev -0.13 0.02 -0.13  -0.05 0.01 -0.14 -0.06 
 *** *** *   *** *** *** 
R&D 0.20 0.16 0.05 -0.13  0.11 0.29 0.22 
 *** 0.00 *** 0.00   ***  
Forecastg    0.13 0.23 -0.06 0.04 0.15  0.19 0.17 
 *** *** * *** ***  *** *** 
Indpb 0.35 0.22 0.15 -0.15 0.31 0.14  0.75 
 *** *** *** *** *** ***  *** 
Indpe 0.29 0.28 0.02 -0.06 0.24 0.14 0.77  
 *** ***  ***  *** ***  
 
 
This table reports the average pair-wise correlation (Pearson\Spearman) for firm-level and 
industry-level characteristics.  The upper triangles reflect the Spearman correlation estimates; the 
lower triangles reflect the Pearson correlation coefficients.  We compute the correlation table 
annually and report the time-series mean of the annual correlations. The asterisks represent the p-
value of the correlation if the result is true in all four sample years.  (***  - p-value < ½0.005½, 
** - p-value < ½0.025½, * - p-value < ½0.05½) 
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Table 3: Country-Level Correlations  
 
 Judsys Antidir Acctstand Imports/ 
GDP 
GDP/cap GDPg Inflation Beta Ex_beta Corrupt 
Judsys       0.16 0.61 0.20 0.79 -0.11 -0.60 0.06 -0.11 -0.84 
  0.3155 0.0001 0.2028 <0.0001 0.4811 <0.0001 0.7117 0.4791 <0.0001 
Antidir     0.13  0.47 0.04 -0.01 0.38 -0.08 0.26 0.31 -0.24 
 0.4081  0.0026 0.8221 0.9672 0.0146 0.6072 0.0979 0.0508 0.1386 
Acctstand   0.57 0.35  0.31 0.46 0.07 -0.52 0.39 -0.11 -0.63 
 0.0002 0.0295  0.0548 0.0035 0.6845 0.0007 0.0147 0.5065 <0.0001 
Imports/GDP 0.14 0.09 0.32  0.19 0.16 -0.19 0.13 -0.18 -0.33 
 0.3744 0.5721 0.0488  0.1942 0.2867 0.2183 0.4026 0.2492 0.0259 
GDP/cap     0.79 0.00 0.50 0.10  -0.43 -0.82 0.12 -0.13 -0.83 
 <0.0001 0.9946 0.0016 0.5175  0.0028 <0.0001 0.4251 0.4156 <0.0001 
GDPg        -0.15 0.28 0.02 0.34 -0.39  0.23 0.03 0.24 0.18 
 0.3577 0.0765 0.9258 0.0215 0.0079  0.1201 0.8669 0.1194 0.2443 
Inflation      -0.39 -0.24 -0.42 -0.10 -0.42 -0.02  -0.19 0.07 0.73 
 0.0108 0.1391 0.0084 0.4945 0.0039 0.8736  0.2250 0.6484 <0.0001 
Beta        0.04 0.23 0.31 0.06 0.05 -0.12 -0.23  0.31 -0.14 
 0.8157 0.1523 0.0615 0.7050 0.7391 0.4567 0.1283  0.0411 0.3499 
Ex_beta     -0.13 0.30 -0.12 0.04 -0.08 0.16 0.04 0.31  0.06 
 0.4224 0.0556 0.4564 0.8149 0.5867 0.3080 0.7987 0.0406  0.6912 
Corrupt -0.84 -0.25 -0.60 -0.22 -0.81 0.19 0.43 -0.13 0.03  
 <0.0001 0.1223 0.0001 0.1469 <0.0001 0.2127 0.0025 0.4073 0.8526  
 
 
This table reports the average pair-wise correlation (Pearson\Spearman) for country-level variables.  The upper triangles reflect the 
Spearman correlation estimates; the lower triangles reflect the Pearson correlation coefficients.  We compute the means of the 
variables across different years, with one observation per country, and calculate the correlation table of the means. The average p-
value of these correlations is also reported. 
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Table 4: Random-Effect Regressions  
 
 Panel A: Price-to-Book   Panel B: Price-to-Earnings 
 Model 1 Model 2   Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept -1.305 -1.388  Intercept -0.414 -1.615 
 (-15.54) (-15.61)   (-0.38) (-1.40) 
Roe 0.137 0.138  Roe   
 (90.62) (90.60)      
Lev -0.00149 -0.00158  Lev 0.0140 0.0130 
 (-4.05) (-4.28)    (3.73) (3.48) 
R&D 0.0479 0.0475  R&D 0.336 0.333 
 (12.29) (12.21)    (8.53) (8.47) 
Forecastg 0.0153 0.0158  Forecastg 0.232 0.236 
 (22.35) (22.78)    (33.20) (33.66) 
Indpb  0.931 0.926  Indpe 1.262 1.255 
 (34.68) (34.49)    (31.61) (31.46) 
GDPg  2.487  GDPg  42.864 
  (2.77)     (4.27) 
Inflation  -0.0131  Inflation  -0.209 
  (-4.45)     (-5.54) 
Corrupt -0.0594 -0.0394  Corrupt -1.221 -0.904 
 (-4.22) (-2.54)    (-6.67) (-4.44) 
Year dummies 
chi2(3) 96.60 91.36  
Year dummies 
chi2(3) 42.92 52.60 
P-value <0.0001 <0.0001  P-value <0.0001 <0.0001 
       
Overall R-sq 0.3978 0.4013  Overall R-sq 0.1035 0.1156 
       
Hausman 
chi2(9) 52.16 38.94  
Hausman 
chi2(11) 128.83 69.69 
p-value <0.0001 0.01  p-value <0.0001 <0.0001 
       
Observations 19,979  19,979   Observations 19,979  19,979  
 
This following regression with random country effect is estimated using data as of June each year:  
   
 
 
 
where Vit  is PBit in panel A and PEit in panel B.  PBit (PEit) is the year t price-to-book ratio 
(price-to-earning ratio) for firm i, and Cj,i,t is the jth characteristic of firm i in year t.  The n firm-
characteristics are: return on equity (ROE), leverage (Lev), R&D-to-Net Sales (R&D), forecasted 
long-term growth (Forecastg), and the industrial harmonic means of the price-to-book ratio and 
price-to-earning ratio (Indpb and Indpe).  Country-level variables include Inflation, real GDP 
growth (GDPg) and Corruption.  The sample is from 6/1995 to 6/1998, inclusive.   
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Table 5: Fixed-Effect Regression of PB and PE Ratios on Various Explanatory Variables 
 
 Panel A: Price-to-Book   Panel B: Price-to-Earnings 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept -1.242 -3.041 -1.716 -0.885 -1.735  Intercept -4.512 -22.226 0.174 35.309 -3.203 
 (-22.50) (-3.53) (-1.92) (-0.90) (-1.15)   (-6.57) (-2.51) (0.02) (3.51) (-0.21) 
Roe 0.132 0.138 0.138 0.138 0.138        
 (91.53) (90.39) (90.44) (90.41) (90.44)        
Lev -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002  Lev 0.023 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 
 (-4.55) (-4.14) (-4.13) (-4.16) (-4.19)   (6.09) (3.51) (3.55) (3.53) (3.50) 
R&D 0.057 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047  R&D 0.463 0.331 0.329 0.330 0.333 
 (14.68) (12.15) (12.13) (12.16) (12.19)   (11.46) (8.41) (8.38) (8.40) (8.50) 
Forecastg 0.014 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016  Forecastg 0.191 0.235 0.236 0.236 0.236 
 (20.75) (22.68) (22.78) (22.80) (22.79)   (26.91) (33.42) (33.64) (33.66) (33.68) 
Indpb 0.988 0.925 0.926 0.925 0.924  Indpe 1.362 1.259 1.263 1.262 1.254 
 (37.21) (34.46) (34.51) (34.49) (34.45)   (34.24) (31.53) (31.70) (31.68) (31.54) 
GDPg    3.859 2.825  GDPg    44.370 27.577 
    (3.43) (2.46)      (3.86) (2.35) 
Inflation    -0.00244 -0.000816  Inflation    -0.404 -0.357 
    (-0.25) (-0.09)      (-4.14) (-3.65) 
GDP/cap     0.0000282  GDP/cap     0.000748 
     (3.19)       (8.28) 
Imports/GDP     1.882  Imports/GDP     16.636 
     (3.57)       (3.09) 
Corrupt   -0.220 -0.198 -0.173  Corrupt   -3.723 -3.148 -2.247 
   (-5.78) (-5.04) (-4.23)     (-9.58) (-7.86) (-5.37) 
Year (F-stat)  67.19 71.76 66.93 27.16  Year (F-stat)  14.61 16.03 17.75 4.43 
P-value  <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001  P-value  <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0041 
Country (F-stat)  20.21 20.98 17.83 15.5  Country (F-stat)  48.58 50.2 41.09 28.45 
P-value  <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001  P-value  <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Adj R-sq 0.3945 0.4252 0.4262 0.4265 0.427  Adj R-sq 0.1204 0.2083 0.2118 0.2131 0.2158 
             
Observations 19,979 19,979 19,979 19,979 19,979  Observations 19,979 19,979 19,979 19,979 19,979 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
 
This table reports the results of a pooled time-series cross-sectional regression based on 
information available as of June each year: 
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where Vit  is PBit in panel A and PEit in panel B.  The dependent variable PBit (PEit) is the year t 
price-to-book ratio (price-to-earning ratio) for firm i in year t.  The independent variable Cj,i,t is 
the jth characteristic of firm i in year t.   
 
The explanatory variables (firm, industry, and country characteristics) that we used are described 
in detail in Appendix B.  In brief, they include: return on equity (Roe), leverage (Lev), R&D-to-
Net-Sales (R&D), forecasted earnings growth rate (Forecastg), the harmonic mean of the 
industrial price-to-book ratio (Indpb), the harmonic mean of the industrial price-to-earning ratio 
(Indpe), and corruption (Corrupt).  Other control variables in the regression include GDP per 
capita (GDP/cap), Imports/GDP ratio (Imports/GDP), real GDP growth (GDPg), and inflation.  
Certain variables (Corrupt, GDP per capita, Imports/GDP ratio, real GDP growth, and Inflation) 
are common across firms in the same country, while other variables (Indpb and Indpe) are 
common across firms in the same industry.  T-statistics of the coefficients are given in brackets 
below the estimates.  Most models also include indicator variables for each country and year.  F-
statistics for the year and country dummies are reported, with corresponding p-values below 
them.  The sample is from 6/1995 to 6/1998.   
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Table 6: Corporate Control, Shareholder Rights, and Instrumental Variable Estimations 
 
 Panel A: Price-to-Book   Panel B: Price-to-Earnings 
  
Model 1 Model 2 
Model 3 
(IV) 
Model 4 
(IV)  
 Model 1 Model 2 
Model 3 
(IV) 
Model 4 
(IV) 
Intercept 3.923 11.031 0.241 18.205  Intercept 67.743 131.191 56.849 234.396 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.22) (5.40)   (0.00) (0.00) (4.91) (8.95) 
Roe 0.139 0.139 0.138 0.139       
 (88.87) (89.04) (90.25) (86.06)       
Lev -0.00157 -0.00159 -0.00152 -0.00162  Lev 0.0130 0.0127 0.0136 0.0132 
 (-4.13) (-4.22) (-4.09) (-4.14)   (3.40) (3.33) (3.58) (3.30) 
R&D 0.0467 0.0470 0.0471 0.0465  R&D 0.326 0.329 0.324 0.321 
 (11.92) (12.01) (12.08) (11.49)   (8.23) (8.35) (8.13) (7.81) 
Forecastg 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016  Forecastg 0.240 0.239 0.239 0.242 
 (22.62) (22.51) (22.84) (22.23)   (33.34) (33.34) (33.48) (32.32) 
Indpb 0.922 0.920 0.927 0.914  Indpe 1.259 1.250 1.273 1.254 
 (33.76) (33.75) (34.49) (32.41)   (31.07) (31.00) (31.48) (29.77) 
GDPg    -2.699  GDPg    -23.509 
    (-1.64)      (-1.45) 
Inflation    0.0435  Inflation    0.0700 
    (3.17)      (0.50) 
GDP/cap  0.000128    GDP/cap  0.00207   
  (8.98)      (14.29)   
Imports/GDP  6.375    Imports/GDP  61.161   
  (7.25)      (6.84)   
Corrupt -0.297 -0.123 -0.520 -1.860  Corrupt -4.443 -1.324 -13.142 -22.216 
 (-6.68) (-2.46) (-4.41) (-12.16)   (-9.78) (-2.59) (-10.76) (-16.87) 
Judsys*Yr 7.08 9.48  38.97  Judsys*Yr 6.28 4.16  71.19 
P-value <0.0001 <0.0001  <0.0001  P-value <0.0001 0.0023  <0.0001 
Antidir*Yr 2.41 19.47  49.32  Antidir*Yr 0.46 27.58  52.9 
P-value 0.065 <0.0001  <0.0001  P-value 0.7095 <0.0001  <0.0001 
Acctstand*Yr 0.000 0.000  27.54  Acctstand*Yr 0.000 0.000  30.73 
P-value 0.9999 0.9998  <0.0001  P-value 0.9999 0.9998  <0.0001 
Year (F-stat) 2.98 3.73 73.51 21.69   Year (F-stat)  2.12 6.03 21.16 25.95 
P-value 0.0301 0.0108 <0.0001 <0.0001  P-value 0.0958 0.0004 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Country (F-
stat) 20.64 22.43 20.59 21.6  
Country (F-
stat) 48.24 42.65 49.07 39.49 
P-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001   <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Adj R-sq 0.4262 0.4292 0.4244 0.3896  Adj R-sq 0.2118 0.2203 0.1886 0.1488 
First-stage 
Adj R-sq   0.9743 0.9801  
First-stage    
Adj R-sq   0.9743 0.9801 
           
Observations 19,289 19,289 19,979 19,289   Observations  19,289 19,289 19,979 19,289 
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Table 6 (Continued) 
 
This table reports the results of a pooled time-series cross-sectional regression based on 
information available as of June each year: 
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where Vit  is PBit in panel A and PEit in panel B.  The dependent variable PBit (PEit) is the year t 
price-to-book ratio (price-to-earning ratio) for firm i in year t.  The independent variable Cj,i,t is 
the jth characteristic of firm i in year t.  
  
The explanatory variables (firm, industry, and country characteristics) that we used are described 
in detail in Appendix B.  In brief, they include: return on equity (Roe), leverage (Lev), R&D-to-
Net-Sales (R&D), forecasted earnings growth rate (Forecastg), the harmonic mean of the 
industrial price-to-book ratio (Indpb), the harmonic mean of the industrial price-to-earning ratio 
(Indpe), and corruption (Corrupt).  Other control variables in the regression include GDP per 
capita (GDP/cap), Imports/GDP ratio (Imports/GDP), real GDP growth (GDPg), and inflation.  
Certain variables (Corruption, GDP per capita, Imports/GDP, real GDP growth, and Inflation) 
are common across firms in the same country, while other variables (Indpb and Indpe) are 
common across firms in the same industry.   
 
T-statistics of the coefficients are given in brackets below the estimates.  All models include 
indicator variables for each country and year.  F-statistics for the year and country dummies are 
reported, with corresponding p-values below them.  Some models also include the interaction 
variables created by multiplying the year dummies with the following three corporate control and 
shareholder rights variables: judicial efficiency (Judsys), accounting standard (Acctstand), and 
anti-director’s rights (Antidir).  The F-statistics and P-values for these variables are reported.   
 
Models 3 and 4 in both panels are two-stage least squared (2SLS) regressions where GDP/cap 
and Imports/GDP ratio are used as instrumental variables for Corrupt.  For these estimations, we 
report the first stage adjusted r-square, as well as the estimated coefficients and test-statistics 
from the second-stage.  The number of observations is reported for each model.  The sample 
period is from 6/1995 to 6/1998, inclusive. 
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Table 7: Fixed-Effect Models with Country-level Market and Currency Betas 
 
 Panel A: Price-to-Book   Panel B: Price-to-Earnings 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
(IV) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
(IV) 
Intercept -1.716 -1.047 -1.241 -0.588 Intercept 0.174 10.460 38.494 62.721 
 (-1.92) (-1.29) (-1.20) (-0.58)  (0.02) (1.27) (3.64) (5.85) 
Roe 0.138 0.138 0.138 0.138      
 (90.44) (90.13) (90.08) (89.88)      
Lev -0.00153 -0.00156 -0.00158 -0.00157 Lev 0.0133 0.0124 0.0123 0.0126 
 (-4.13) (-4.21) (-4.24) (-4.21)  (3.55) (3.30) (3.29) (3.31) 
R&D 0.0472 0.0468 0.0469 0.0468 R&D 0.3293 0.3286 0.3288 0.3241 
 (12.13) (12.02) (12.04) (11.99)  (8.38) (8.36) (8.37) (8.13) 
Forecastg 0.0158 0.0159 0.0159 0.0161 Forecastg 0.236 0.237 0.237 0.240 
 (22.78) (22.81) (22.84) (22.91)  (33.64) (33.53) (33.56) (33.45) 
Indpb 0.926 0.931 0.931 0.931 Indpe 1.263 1.260 1.260 1.267 
 (34.51) (34.52) (34.52) (34.47)  (31.70) (31.52) (31.52) (31.26) 
Beta  0.070 0.041 -0.055 Beta  3.338 3.352 0.439 
  (1.02) (0.59) (-0.70)   (4.75) (4.72) (0.50) 
Ex_beta  -0.188 -0.201 -0.113 Ex_beta  -1.120 -1.411 1.257 
  (-3.73) (-3.98) (-1.84)   (-2.18) (-2.73) (1.89) 
GDPg   4.348 3.077 GDPg   36.042 0.000 
   (3.75) (2.44)    (3.05) (0.71) 
Inflation   -0.00288 0.0132 Inflation   -0.525 -0.0469 
   (-0.27) (1.07)    (-4.84) (-0.35) 
Corrupt -0.220 -0.189 -0.164 -0.507 Corrupt -3.723 -3.326 -2.738 -12.699 
 (-5.78) (-4.80) (-4.03) (-3.63)  (-9.58) (-8.26) (-6.61) (-8.98) 
 Year        
(F-stat)  71.76 65.94 62.53 62.88 
 Year         
(F-stat)  16.03 16.89 18.76 19.22 
 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001  <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Country    
(F-stat) 20.98 20.94 17.89 17.58 
Country     
(F-stat) 50.2 49.16 40.58 35.32 
 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001  <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Adj R-sq 0.4262 0.4257 0.4261 0.424 Adj R-sq 0.2118 0.2121 0.2135 0.1905 
First-stage 
Adj R-sq 
   0.9762     0.9761 
          
Observations 19,979 19,829 19,829 19,829  Observations 19,979 19,829 19,829 19,829 
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Table 7 (Continued) 
 
Table 7 reports the results of a pooled time-series cross-sectional regression based on information 
available as of June each year: 
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where Vit  is PBit in panel A and PEit in panel B.  The dependent variable PBit (PEit) is the year t price-to-
book ratio (price-to-earning ratio) for firm i in year t.  The independent variable Cj,i,t is the j
th characteristic 
of firm i in year t.   
 
The explanatory variables (firm, industry, and country characteristics) that we used are described in detail 
in Appendix B.  In brief, they include: return on equity (Roe), leverage (Lev), R&D-to-Net-Sales (R&D), 
forecasted earnings growth rate (Forecastg), the harmonic mean of the industrial price-to-book ratio 
(Indpb), the harmonic mean of the industrial price-to-earning ratio (Indpe), and corruption (Corrupt).  
Other control variables in the regression include country beta (Beta), exchange rate beta (Ex_beta), (see 
the following description), real GDP growth (GDPg), and inflation.  Certain variables (Corruption, GDP 
per capita, Import/GDP ratio, real GDP growth, Inflation, Ex_Beta, and Beta) are common across firms in 
the same country, while  other variables (Indpb and Indpe) are common across firms in the same industry.  
T-statistics of the coefficients are given in brackets below the estimates.  Most models also include 
indicator variables for each country and year.  F-statistics for the year and country dummies are reported, 
with corresponding p-values below them.  The sample is from 6/1995 to 6/1998.   
 
Country beta (Beta) refers to the beta of the country stock index relative to the MSCI world stock index.  
Exchange rate beta (Ex_beta) refers to the beta of the country stock index relative to an exchange rate 
index of the US dollar.  To compute Beta and Ex_beta, we use the two-factor model: 
 
   
The dependent variable is the monthly dollar return on the stock market index where the firm is located.  
The two factors on the right hand side of the regression are (i) the market factor (rm – rf), which is the 
excess dollar return of the value-weighted MSCI world market portfolio, and (ii) the currency factor 
which is the return on the US dollar vis-à-vis the other six countries in the G7 (weighted by the relative 
stock-market capitalization).  An increase in the index implies US dollar depreciates against the basket of 
currencies.  The rolling 60-month return of the indices are used, and the regression coefficients are the 
Beta and the Ex_beta.  
 
Models 4 in both panels are two-stage least squared (2SLS) regressions where GDP/cap and Imports/GDP 
ratio are used as instrumental variables for Corrupt.  For these estimations, we report the first stage 
adjusted r-square, as well as the estimated coefficients and test-statistics from the second-stage.  The 
number of observations is reported for each model.  The sample period is from 6/1995 to 6/1998, 
inclusive. 
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Table 8:  The Differential Effect of Current ROE, R&D Expense, and Forecasted Growth 
in High and Low Corruption Countries 
 Panel A: Price-to-Book   Panel B: Price-to-Earnings 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept -2.571 -1.599 -2.989 -1.979 Intercept -19.326 29.175 -21.895 25.718 
 (-2.97) (-1.57) (-3.46) (-1.94)  (-2.18) (2.80) (-2.48) (2.47) 
Roe 0.140 0.140 0.137 0.138      
 (88.64) (88.31) (49.03) (48.84)      
Lev -0.00159 -0.00163 -0.00155 -0.00160 Lev 0.0131 0.0122 0.0136 0.0126 
 (-4.28) (-4.38) (-4.19) (-4.30)  (0.004) (3.25) (3.60) (3.36) 
R&D 0.0466 0.0463 0.0453 0.0452 R&D 0.324 0.323 0.340 0.339 
 (11.96) (11.88) (11.43) (11.36)  (0.04) (8.20) (8.46) (8.44) 
Forecastg 0.0166 0.0167 0.0143 0.0146 Forecastg 0.246 0.247 0.226 0.227 
 (22.63) (22.64) (13.11) (13.25)  (0.01) (33.20) (20.39) (20.29) 
Indpb 0.920 0.926 0.925 0.930 Indpe 1.253 1.252 1.256 1.254 
 (34.26) (34.31) (34.38) (34.43)  (0.04) (31.30) (31.38) (31.30) 
GDPg  4.978  4.935 GDPg  45.075  46.054 
  (4.33)  (4.29)   (3.84)  (3.92) 
Inflation  -0.0103  -0.0108 Inflation  -0.672  -0.655 
  (-0.99)  (-1.04)   (-6.28)  (-6.13) 
Beta  0.0906  0.0871 Beta  4.142  4.122 
  (1.32)  (1.27)   (5.91)  (5.88) 
Ex_beta  -0.240  -0.243 Ex_beta  -2.080  -2.117 
  (-4.85)  (-4.92)   (-4.12)  (-4.19) 
CorrHi*ROE -0.0301 -0.0291        
 (-5.21) (-4.97)        
CorrHi* R&D 0.000 0.000   CorrHi* R&D 0.000 0.000   
 (-0.70) (-0.84)    (0.00) (-0.58)   
CorrHi* 
Forecastg -0.00761 -0.00726   
CorrHi* 
Forecastg -0.107 -0.110   
 (-3.34) (-3.16)    (0.02) (-4.70)   
CorrLo*ROE   0.000860 -0.000383      
   (0.26) (-0.11)      
CorrLo* R&D   0.000131 0.000132 
CorrLo* 
RandD   -0.00125 -0.00124 
   (1.83) (1.85)    (-1.71) (-1.71) 
CorrLo* 
Forecastg   0.00259 0.00226 
CorrLo* 
Forecastg   0.0150 0.0142 
   (1.85) (1.60)    (1.06) (0.99) 
 Year (F-stat) 66.81 58.88 67.05 59.01  Year (F-stat) 14.42 21.36 14.53 21.65 
 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001  <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Country      
(F-stat) 18.07 17.91 20.09 17.9 
Country      
(F-stat) 46.46 43.91 47.56 40.1 
 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001  <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Adj R-sq 0.4262 0.4265 0.4254 0.4257 Adj R-sq 0.209 0.2126 0.2083 0.2119 
          
 Observations 19,979 19,829 19,979 19,829  Observations 19,979 19,829 19,979 19,829 
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Table 8 (continued)  
 
This table provides evidence on the differential effect of ROE, R&D, and Forecast Growth on PB and PE 
in high-corruption and low-corruption countries.   To construct this table, we estimated the following 
pooled time-series cross-sectional regression using data publicly available as of June each year: 
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where Vit  is PBit in panel A and PEit in panel B.  PBit (PEit) is the year t price-to-book ratio (price-to-
earning ratio) for firm i, and Cj,i,t is the j
th characteristic of firm i in year t.  The n firm-characteristics are: 
return on equity (ROE), leverage (Lev), R&D-to-Net Sales (R&D), forecasted long-term growth 
(Forecastg), the harmonic mean of the industrial price-to-book ratio (Indpb), and the harmonic mean of 
the industrial price-to-earning ratio (Indpe).  Other control variables in the regression include country beta 
(Beta), exchange rate beta (Ex_beta), (see the following description),  real GDP growth (GDPg), and 
inflation. Certain variables (real GDP growth, Infla tion, Ex_Beta, and Beta) are common across firms in 
the same country, while other variables (Indpb and Indpe) are common across firms in the same industry.  
 
HiCorr is an indicator variable that equals one in a country with high corruption (a score above 5.5 on 
average across years) and zero otherwise. LoCorr is the corresponding indicator variable for a country 
with low corruption (an average score below 2.5).  HiCorr*ROE refers to the interaction variable formed 
by multiplying HiCorr with ROE.  HiCorr*R&D and HiCorr*Forecastg are the interaction variables 
formed by multiplying HiCorr with R&D and Forecasted growth.  Similarly, LoCorr is also multiplied by 
ROE, R&D and Forecastg to form the corresponding interaction variables.   
 
The sample period is from 6/1995 to 6/1998.  T-statistics of the coefficients are given in brackets below 
the estimates.  Most models include indicator variables for each country and year.  F-statistics for the year 
and country dummies are reported, with corresponding p-values below them.   
 
Country beta (Beta) refers to the beta of the country stock index relative to the MSCI world stock index.  
Exchange rate beta (Ex_beta) refers to the beta of the country stock index relative to an exchange rate 
index of the US dollar.  To compute Beta and Ex_beta, we use the two-factor model: 
 
   
The dependent variable is the monthly dollar return on the stock market index where the firm is located.  
The two factors on the right hand side of the regression are (i) the market factor (rm – rf), which is the 
excess dollar return of the value-weighted MSCI world market portfolio, and (ii) the currency factor 
which is the return on the US dollar vis-à-vis the other six countries in the G7 (weighted by the relative 
stock-market capitalization).  An increase in the index implies US dollar depreciates against the basket of 
currencies.  The rolling 60-month return of the indices is used, and the regression coefficients are the Beta 
and the Ex_beta.  
ti
e
ftmfti errarr ,,, )( mbb +D+-+=-
 43 
Table 9: Separate Regressions for Industrial and Developing Countries 
 
 Panel A: Price-to-Book  Panel B:  Price-to-Earnings 
 Industrial Countries  Developing Countries   Industrial Countries  Developing Countries  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept -1.499 -2.114 -1.163 -1.116 Intercept -1.761 -10.796 -0.910 0.711 
 (-9.29) (-10.90) (-0.77) (-0.72)  (-1.05) (-5.39) (-0.06) (0.04) 
Roe 0.140 0.140 0.126 0.127      
 (83.50) (83.50) (35.38) (34.73)      
Lev -0.00187 -0.00190 -0.0000516 -0.000320 Lev 0.00783 0.00754 0.04190 0.03706 
 (-4.55) (-4.62) (-0.06) (-0.37)  (1.90) (1.83) (4.79) (4.17) 
R&D 0.0457 0.0458 0.0658 0.0639 R&D 0.303 0.305 0.682 0.710 
 (11.54) (11.59) (2.34) (2.23)  (7.62) (7.69) (2.32) (2.38) 
Forecastg 0.0166 0.0164 0.0130 0.0135 Forecastg 0.252 0.250 0.176 0.179 
 (21.03) (20.89) (9.10) (9.18)  (31.80) (31.62) (11.85) (11.72) 
Indpb 0.930 0.929 0.803 0.830 Indpe 1.282 1.276 0.931 0.928 
 (31.99) (31.95) (11.40) (11.44)  (29.90) (29.80) (8.73) (8.51) 
GDPg -0.219 1.588 3.568 7.351 GDPg 35.149 29.961 17.113 29.243 
 (-0.14) (0.89) (2.03) (3.48)  (2.23) (1.65) (0.93) (1.33) 
Inflation -0.129 -0.127 -0.0200 0.0105 Inflation -1.911 -1.874 -0.414 -0.283 
 (-5.55) (-5.47) (-1.78) (0.77)  (-8.11) (-7.96) (-3.51) (-1.98) 
Beta  0.701  -0.395 Beta  9.630  -2.025 
  (6.19)  (-3.80)   (8.39)  (-1.87) 
Ex_beta  -0.473  0.140 Ex_beta  -3.977  0.430 
  (-5.41)  (1.63)   (-4.49)  (0.48) 
Corrupt -0.212 -0.075 -0.007 -0.018 Corrupt -3.491 -2.149 0.316 0.194 
 (-4.35) (-1.40) (-0.09) (-0.23)  (-7.06) (-3.96) (0.40) (0.23) 
Year  (F-stat) 81.92 62.83 7.53 4.67 Year  (F-stat) 29.85 24.46 10.22 7.34 
 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0001 0.0029  <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0001 
Country     
(F-stat) 16.27 16.83 12.28 12.72 
Country      
(F-stat) 35.56 35.35 9.12 8.7 
 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001  <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Adj R-sq 0.4325 0.434 0.4171 0.4157 Adj R-sq 0.2285 0.2317 0.1666 0.1628 
          
Observations 16,561 16,561 3,418 3,268 Observations 16,561 16,561 3,418 3,268 
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Table 9 (continued) 
 
This following regression is estimated as of June each year: 
   
   
 
 
 
 
where Vit  is PBit in panel A and PEit in panel B.  PBit (PEit) is the year t price-to-book ratio (price-to-earning 
ratio) for firm i, and Cj,i,t is the j
th characteristic of firm i in year t.   
 
The n firm-characteristics are: return on equity (ROE), leverage (Lev), R&D-to-Net Sales (R&D), forecasted 
long-term growth (Forecastg), the harmonic mean of the industrial price-to-book ratio (Indpb), the harmonic 
mean of the industrial price-to-earning ratio (Indpe), and corruption (Corrupt).  Other control variables in the 
regression include country beta (Beta), exchange rate beta (Ex_beta), (see the following description),  real 
GDP growth (GDPg), and inflation. Certain variables (Corruption, real GDP growth, Inflation, Ex_Beta, and 
Beta) are common across firms in the same country, while other variables (Indpb and Indpe) are common 
across firms in the same industry.  The sample is from 6/1995 to 6/1998.   
 
The first two columns in each panel report results of the regressions for industrial countries, defined by the 
World Bank’s IFC classification in 1998.  The last two columns in each panel report the results of the 
regressions for developing countries, defined by the World Bank’s IFC. 
 
Country beta (Beta) refers to the beta of the country stock index relative to the MSCI world stock index.  
Exchange rate beta (Ex_beta) refers to the beta of the country stock index relative to an exchange rate index 
of the US dollar.  To compute Beta and Ex_beta, we use the two-factor model: 
 
   
 
 
The dependent variable is the monthly dollar return on the stock market index where the firm is located.  The 
two factors on the right hand side of the regression are (i) the market factor (rm – rf), which is the excess dollar 
return of the value-weighted MSCI world market portfolio, and (ii) the currency factor which is the return on 
the US dollar vis-à-vis the other six countries in the G7 (weighted by the relative stock-market capitalization).  
An increase in the index implies US dollar depreciates against the basket of currencies.  The rolling 60-month 
return of the indices is used, and the regression coefficients are the Beta and the Ex_beta. 
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Table 10:  Regressions Based on Top-100 Firms in Each Country 
 
 Panel A: Price-to-Book   Panel B: Price-to-Earnings 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept -2.621 -3.167 1.379  Intercept 12.944 13.564 24.043 
 (-2.64) (-3.0) (2.31)   (1.30) (1.28) (3.99) 
Roe 0.136 0.137 0.138      
 (63.07) (62.84) (60.84)      
Lev -0.00138 -0.00146 -0.00147  Lev 0.0226 0.0207 0.0221 
 (-2.70) (-2.84) (-2.75)   (4.42) (4.03) (4.14) 
R&D 0.0639 0.0633 0.0622  R&D 0.0629 0.0626 0.0548 
 (7.54) (7.44) (7.24)   (0.74) (0.74) (0.64) 
Forecastg 0.0154 0.0157 0.0158  Forecastg 0.2203 0.2226 0.2281 
 (15.55) (15.74) (15.16)   (22.26) (22.27) (21.89) 
 Indpb  0.836 0.849 0.828   Indpe  1.055 1.054 1.040 
 (20.71) (20.84) (19.76)   (17.62) (17.50) (16.75) 
GDPg 5.188 4.139 1.114  GDPg 41.898 27.972 9.033 
 (3.89) (2.97) (0.64)   (3.12) (2.00) (0.52) 
Inflation 0.0142 0.0209 0.0048  Inflation -0.210 -0.255 -0.314 
 (1.46) (1.90) (0.38)   (-2.16) (-2.31) (-2.45) 
Beta  -0.355 -0.525  Beta  -0.702 -2.182 
  (-4.66) (-5.16)    (-0.91) (-2.13) 
Ex_beta  -0.318 -0.230  Ex_beta  -2.637 -1.939 
  (-5.44) (-3.56)    (-4.49) (-2.98) 
Corrupt -0.0824 -0.0552 -0.176  Corrupt -1.142 -0.837 -1.874 
 (-1.91) (-1.25) (-3.55)   (-2.63) (-1.88) (-3.75) 
Judsys*Yr   8.27  Judsys*Yr   5.77 
P-value   <0.0001  P-value   0.0001 
Antidir*Yr   8.34  Antidir*Yr   7.92 
P-value   <0.0001  P-value   <0.0001 
Acctstand*Yr   2.77  Acctstand*Yr   2.22 
P-value   0.0258  P-value   0.0645 
 Year (F-stat)  50.2 35.99 5.77   Year (F-stat)  9.25 7.82 3.78 
 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0006   <0.0001 <0.0001 0.01 
Country        
(F-stat) 20.43 20.48 23.65  
Country          
(F-stat) 30.77 31.95 35.02 
 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001   <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Adj R-sq 0.4588 0.4611 0.467  Adj R-sq 0.2122 0.2131 0.2187 
         
 Observations  9,344 9,194 8,615   Observations  9,344 9,194 8,615 
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Table 10 (continued)  
 
Table 10 reports the regression results for the subset of the sample where each country is limited to only the 
top 100 largest companies.   The following pooled time-series cross-sectional regression is estimated using 
data publicly available as of June each year: 
  
   
 
 
 
 
where Vit  is PBit in panel A and PEit in panel B.  PBit (PEit) is the year t price-to-book ratio (price-to-earning 
ratio) for firm i, and Cj,i,t is the j
th characteristic of firm i in year t.   
 
The n firm-characteristics are: return on equity (Roe), leverage (Lev), R&D-to-Net Sales (R&D), forecasted 
long-term growth (Forecastg), industrial harmonic mean of the price-to-book ratio (Indpb), industrial 
harmonic mean of the price-to-earning ratio (Indpe), and corruption (Corrupt). Other control variables in the 
regression include country beta (Beta), exchange rate beta (Ex_beta), (see the following description),  real 
GDP growth (GDPg), and inflation.   
 
Certain variables (Corruption, real GDP growth, Inflation, Ex_Beta, and Beta) are common across firms in 
the same country, while other variables (Indpb and Indpe) are common across firms in the same industry.  
The sample is from 6/1995 to 6/1998.  T-statistics of the coefficients are given in brackets below the 
estimates.  The models include indicator variables for each country and year.  F-statistics for the year and 
country dummies are reported, with corresponding p-values below them.   
 
Country beta (Beta) refers to the beta of the country stock index relative to the MSCI world stock index.  
Exchange rate beta (Ex_beta) refers to the beta of the country stock index relative to an exchange rate index 
of the US dollar.  To compute Beta and Ex_beta, we use the two-factor model: 
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The dependent variable is the monthly dollar return on the stock market index where the firm is located.  The 
two factors on the right hand side of the regression are (i) the market factor (rm – rf), which is the excess 
dollar return of the value-weighted MSCI world market portfolio, and (ii) the currency factor which is the 
return on the US dollar vis-à-vis the other six countries in the G7 (weighted by the relative stock-market 
capitalization).  An increase in the index implies US dollar depreciates against the basket of currencies.  The 
rolling 60-month return of the indices is used, and the regression coefficients are the Beta and the Ex_beta.  
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